Hate Speech in Cyberspace: Bitterness without Boundaries by Shaw, LaShel
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 25
Issue 1 Symposium on Censorship & the Media Article 9
1-1-2012
Hate Speech in Cyberspace: Bitterness without
Boundaries
LaShel Shaw
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
LaShel Shaw, Hate Speech in Cyberspace: Bitterness without Boundaries, 25 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 279 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol25/iss1/9
NOTES




If the pen is mightier than the sword, today's computer key-
boards may be mightier than tanks and machine guns-and just
as destructive. The Internet offers a cloak of anonymity which
often leads people to type things they would never say to some-
one's face. Even in its infancy, the Internet became a powerful
vehicle for hate. In 1996, an anonymous email user sent racist
messages to over sixty Asian students at the University of Califor-
nia, Irvine, blaming them for various problems on campus and
threatening to hunt them down one by one to kill them.' Several
students changed their class schedules, and some even left the
school.'
As Internet use has become more widespread, the frequency
and impact of such hurtful behavior has only increased. Some
examples are very dramatic, such as Lori Drew's use of a MySpace
account to impersonate a teenage boy to tell her daughter's thir-
teen year-old friend that "the world would be a better place with-
out her in it," which led the girl to commit suicide.' Just as
harmful are the routine comments left on websites visited by mil-
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bers of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy for their editing
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1. Michael J. Gennaco, Hate on the Internet, 21 CHicANo-LATINo L. REV. 1,
1 (2000).
2. Id.
3. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Unfortu-
nately, the Lori Drew incident was not an isolated event-other teenagers have
also killed themselves in response to cyber bullying. See, e.g., Alexander B.
Punger, Mapping the World Wide Web: Using Calder v. Jones to Create a Framework
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lions of people every day, demeaning women, minorities, even
(or perhaps especially) the overweight.'
In fact, making hateful and extremist statements on the
Internet in order to get a reaction has become a popular form of
recreation among some people. These people are disparagingly
known in the online community as "trolls."' Some individuals
even hold numerous accounts, so they can post hateful state-
ments under one user name and then use their other accounts to
add a chorus of agreement, leading other users to believe the
troll has widespread support for their inflammatory remarks.'
Just as the ugly creature who tried to devour the Billy Goats Gruff
monopolized the fairytale bridge,7 modern day trolls terrorize
those trying to use the Internet and undermine its utility as a
result.'
Not only is hate speech more likely to happen on the
Internet, where anonymity is easily obtained and speakers are
psychologically distant from their audience, but its online nature
also gives it a far-reaching and determinative impact. Today's
public consciousness is shaped not in the streets or the parks, but
in online editorials and web forums.' All too often, these pages
fill up with insults and racist swill.
Under this deluge of hate and bullying, one scholar has
commented that "the free flow of information on the Internet
for Analyzing when Statements Written on the Internet Give Rise to Personal jurisdiction,
87 N.C. L. Riv. 1952, 1953 (2009).
4. For instance, one woman shared a story about being self conscious
while exercising on the popular website fmylife.com, and was greeted with a
chorus of comments such as "I've seen you whales waddling around and dont
[sic] know how I managed to hold myself from vomiting ... [D]ont [sic] leave
the house till youve [sic] done a couple of pushups dumbo." Dzin, Comment
to Posting by Fat Runner, F My LIFE, http://www.fmylife.com/health/6163418
(Nov. 12, 2009, 1:30 EST).
5. See generally Todd Leopold, #@*!!! Anonymous Anger Rampant on Internet,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/11/03/angry.internet/index.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2011) (discussing anger on the Internet and the various
groups, including trolls, who fan the flames); Mattathias Schwartz, Malwebolence,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 2008, at MM24 (describing the culture of dedicated trolls
and hackers who compete for negative attention online).
6. S.E. Smith, What Is an Internet Troll?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.
com/what-is-an-internet-troll.htm (last modified Feb. 8, 2011).
7. GEORGE WEBBE DASENT, PoPulAR TALES FROM THF NORSE 264 (2d ed.
1912).
8. It is worth noting, however, that the designation of "troll" is a refer-
ence to fishing, because the individuals troll forums for a response like boat
crews troll for fish, and did not originate in reference to the mythological crea-
ture. Smith, supra note 6.
9. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 802-03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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can make us less free.""o Anti-social Internet behaviors, includ-
ing hate speech and cyber bullying, have negatively impacted the
lives of people all over the world." It is no surprise that the Sec-
retary General of the United Nations has said that the use of the
Internet to spread hate speech is one of the most important chal-
lenges to human rights to have arisen from modern technologi-
cal development.1 2
This Note will explore the problem of hate speech on the
Internet, advocating for measures that incorporate transparency
and user-driven discussion. First, this Note will explore how
harmful hate speech can be and contrast this with the danger of
over-restricting free speech.'" Because of the difficulty in balanc-
ing these important human rights interests, including constitu-
tional concerns, hate speech is best regulated on a local level.'
At the same time, however, the global nature of the Internet
makes local regulation by individual national governments
impractical, both because of technological constraints and legiti-
macy concerns." This leaves regulation in the hands of corpora-
tions, many of which have approached the problem by
employing moderators to police content.'6 This is not a prefera-
ble solution because the lack of transparency makes it difficult
for users to defend their human rights." Instead, a system where
content is discussed publically before the moderator makes a
transparent determination concerning its fate offers a solution
that potentially increases awareness of and sensitivity to the prob-
lem, while allowing the online community of users to better
define hate speech according to their own "local"
understandings.'"
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
Hate speech presents serious human rights issues. As Alex-
ander Tsesis has observed, "Prejudicial speech initiates, perpetu-
ates, and aggravates socially accepted misrepresentation about
10. DANIELJ. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 2 (2007).
11. See Sajai Singh, Anti-Social Networking: Learning the Art of Making Ene-
mies in Web 2.0, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2008, at 3, 7.
12. The Secretary-General, Preliminary Rep. of the Secretary-General on Global-
ization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, 11 26-28, U.N.
Doc. A/55/342 (Aug. 31, 2000).
13. See infra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
15. See infta notes 61-100 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 101-16 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 101-29 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
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outgroups .... The greater the barrage of misethnic and subor-
dinating stereotypes, the more likely it is that persons with
intense hatreds will release their pent-up frustration and angers
on vulnerable minorities."9 The relationship between hate
speech and violence is vividly acted out in history." Hate speech
played a major role in exacerbating the violence in Bosnia,2 in
justifying slavery in Colonial and pre-Civil War America," and in
the rise of the Third Reich." Indeed, the very purpose of hate
speech is often to deny the victim's humanity and "make them
objects of ridicule and humiliation such that acts of aggression
against them are perceived less seriously."" Like shouting "fire"
in a crowded movie theater, hate speech can cause a violent and
potentially deadly stampede.25
Hateful words, even those that do not rise to the level of
incitement to violence, can cause very real psychological harm to
the victims even while reinforcing potentially dangerous beliefs
in the minds of the audience." The racist messages that hate
speech often encapsulates, for instance, have been shown to have
significant negative impact on parenting practices, and have even
been linked to mental illnesses and psychosomatic disease."
Allowing hate speech may even adversely affect the speaker, who
19. ALEXANDER TSESis, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES
THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 138 (2002).
20. John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REv.
539, 546 (2006).
21. Id.
22. TSESis, supra note 19, at 28-48.
23. Id. at 11-27. Tsesis also ties the Rwandan genocide directly to a pat-
tern of hate speech and prejudice. Id. at 66; see also Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or
Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA.J. INT'L L. 485, 501 (2008)
(explaining that deliberate and "systemic campaigns of hate speech" is the root
of genocide).
24. Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Free-
dom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 789, 792 (1996).
25. Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a
Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 497, 509 (2009) (citing Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
26. See TsEsis, supra note 19. See also SAMUEL P. NELSON, BEYOND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT. THE POLITICS OF FREE SPEECH AND PLURALISM 111 (2005)
(stating "one implication of freedom of speech is the social mutability of the
individual. Speech acts and the relationships they create change the people
who are involved."); Knechtle, supra note 20, at 557 (explaining that law in the
United States does not address the harms of speech to the same extent as other
countries).
27. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv' C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 136-38 (1982).
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is more likely to become entrenched in his or her hateful beliefs
if given the legitimacy of a global audience. 28
Nevertheless, the over-regulation of hateful speech also cre-
ates serious concerns. Some scholars have even argued that gov-
ernment regulation of hate speech threatens to destroy
democracy. Robert Post, for instance, advocates that public dis-
course is so critical to the development of a democratic collective
will that "racist speech is and ought to be immune from regula-
tion."2 ' Although there is an alternative view, strongly defended
by scholars such as Alexander Tsesis,so a robust protection of
freedom of speech has clearly won out in American
jurisprudence."
Limits on freedom of speech may not only endanger democ-
racy, but can also have a negative impact on the individual being
prohibited from speaking. Freedom of speech is an individual
28. See Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Countering Hate on the Internet: A Rejoin-
der, 2.2 AMSTERDAM L. F. (2010), available at http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/article/
view/138/264 (explaining "[s]ocial science evidence indicates that permitting
someone to say or do hurtful things to another person increases, rather than
decreases, the chance that he or she will do so again."). Cohen-Almagor goes
on to discuss the correlation between hate speech and negative social behavior,
stating "[O]bservers may do likewise, creating a climate in which the targets are
at an even greater risk. Once the speaker forms the category of the victim who
deserves what she gets, that behavior is apt to continue and even escalate to
include material discrimination and physical bullying." Id.
29. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32
Wm. & MARY L. REv. 267, 322 (1991).
30. TSESIs, supra note 19, at 499-501 (explaining that hate speech can
actually harm the democratic process because it "can delegitimize the opinions
of disfavored groups" and reduces political participation by minorities, stymie-
ing policy and legislative debates). See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the
Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1144 (2005) (according
to the affirmative theory of the First Amendment, ensuring each citizen can
express themselves meaningfully may require government involvement in the
market to protect free speech). See also TsEis, supra note 19, at 179 ("Hate
speech does not further political discourse; instead, it escalates the threat to law
and order.").
31. See Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States
Versus the Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 377, 378. Despite the
Supreme Court's statement in Gitlow v. New York that "[i]t cannot be said that
the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the exercise of its judg-
ment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it
seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or
blazed into the conflagration," Gitiow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925),
recently the Court has treated hate speech in the tradition of Justice Black,
instituting "a near-blanket prohibition against regulation regulating speech
based on its misethnic content," see TsEsis, supra note 19, at 126.
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liberty and essential to personal autonomy.3 2 Potential victims
can be harmed by over-regulation of speech, too; complete bans
on hateful speech can reinforce the paternalistic idea that the
marginalized need government protection and can turn racists
into revered martyrs of libertarianism and anti-federalism.3 3 Fur-
thermore, with the "musk of the taboo," hate speech bans can
lead to the lionization of racist thugs and make hateful ideolo-
gies more appealing to impressionable youth. 4
The tension between these different demands of human
rights reflects the dualistic nature of human dignity. From one
perspective, human dignity demands autonomy. A government
that does not respect people's choices and beliefs may violate
their dignity. It is crucially important that people be allowed to
shape their own identities, as the Hungarian Constitutional
Court explained in discussing laws restricting legal names.
There, the court held that dignity includes an inalienable right
to bear a name reflecting one's self-identity."b This is not a
uniquely Hungarian view-in a case before the European Court
of Human Rights concerning the right of transsexuals to present
themselves to society as they choose, the relationship between
dignity and self-determination was similarly stressed.3 ' The court
observed that "society may be reasonably expected to tolerate a
32. SOLOVE, supra note 10, at 129-32. But see CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.
coM 49-50 (2001) ("[W]e are likely to think that freedom consists in the satis-
faction of private preferences-in an absence of restrictions on individual
choices. This is a widely held view about freedom [but] it is badly miscon-
ceived. Freedom consists not simply in preference satisfaction but also in the
chance to have preferences and beliefs formed under decent conditions .... ).
33. R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The Case
ofFree Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 527, 566 (2006) (quoting
Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its
Interment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129, 1141 (1993)).
34. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First
Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred
Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 Tut. L. REv. 1549, 1598-99 (2004) (describ-
ing what Krotoszynski sees as the failure of Germany's attempts to protect dig-
nity). See also JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE
PERFORMATIVE 131 (1997) (arguing that censorship, by forbidding certain words
and ideas, reinforces them and "the effort to constrain the term culminates in
its very proliferation").
35. See Alkotminybfr6s:ig (AB) [Constitutional Court] Dec. 3, 2001, 58/
2001 (XII. 7) (Hung.), translated in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL COURT OF HUNGARY (1998-2001) 404-43 (Andrds Holl6 & Arpid Erdei
eds., 2005) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF HUNGARY].
36. Id.
37. I. v. United Kingdom, 592 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), at para. 36, available at
http://cniskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search "25680/
94" in the "Application Number" field).
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certain inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and
worth in accordance with the sexual identity chosen by them at
great personal cost."" While free speech might not always touch
on the same core aspects of self as personal names and sexual
identity, similar implications arise whenever people are prohib-
ited from full self-expression.3 9
In contrast to this conception of dignity, which embodies
people's ability to make free choices, dignity also plays a role in
empowering government to limit the freedom of their citizens.
The most famous example of this case was decided by a French
court over a decade ago when it determined that the sport of
dwarf throwing was an affront to human dignity, even when it was
done with the full consent of all the parties involved.40 Though
this case is older, the sentiment it expresses is not outmoded-a
recent French journal article urged that minimum weight
requirements and physical inspections be imposed on all fashion
models, in order to ensure that fashion shows do not remain
spectacles exploiting those suffering from anorexia." Particu-
larly in Europe, this more paternalistic view of dignity has been
used to limit Nazi speech4 2 and even prohibit the display of polit-
ically critical artwork.13
In many situations, the two conceptions of dignity are argua-
bly at odds with each other." Dignity-as-liberty demands that
38. Id. at para. 71.
39. See Patricia Loughlan, Copyright Law, Free Speech and Self-Fulfillment, 24
SYDNEY L. REv. 427, 431 (2002) ("The individual, cognitive self is developed and
constituted through expressive, communicative activity and, accordingly, to
interfere with that activity is to interfere with the development and realisation
of the self and the manifestation of a unique personality.").
40. Conseil D'Etat [CE] [Highest Administrative Court], Oct. 27, 1995,
Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge (Fr.), available in French at http://www.rajf.
org/article.php3?idarticle=245.
41. Marc le Roy, Le Maire, le mannequin, et la protection de la digniti de la
personne humaine, 2008 ACTUALITi JURIDIQUE EDITION DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 80,
available in French at http://www.psychanalyse-en-mouvement.net/anorexie:
voix.off/index.php.
42. See Alkotminybir6sdg (AB) [Constitutional Court] May 9, 2000, 14/
2000 (V. 12) (Hung.), translated in CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF HUNGARY, supra
note 35, at 189.
43. Vereinigung Bildender KInstler v. Austria, 79 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007, at
para. 21, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=
hudoc-en (search "68354/01" in the "Application Number" field).
44. This explains, for instance, why cases on both sides of the abortion
debate have invoked dignity. Compare Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] 39, 1 (Ger.) as discussed in Marc Chase McAl-
lister, Human Dignity and Individual Liberty in Germany and the United States as
Examined Through Each Country's Leading Abortion Cases, 11 TUlSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 491, 511 (2004) with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
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people be free to express themselves, but dignity-as-constraint
suggests that unfettered hateful or racist speech should not be
permitted because it demeans the victims and undermines the
social health of the community. An overzealous censor poses as
much a threat to human dignity as a hateful propagandist. 5
NATIONAL DIFFERENCES
While achieving a balance between these two important val-
ues of human rights is difficult enough on a local setting, it
becomes nearly impossible in the global, anonymous context of
the Internet. Each nation has taken a different approach to bal-
ancing dignity and free speech. For instance, in the United
States, hate speech is only prohibited when it creates a threat of
immediate violence, 6 while in many European countries defend-
ing the Holocaust or collecting Nazi memorabilia is criminally
prohibited." Predictably, "with the expansion of the Internet,
new regulatory challenges more frequently arise because of the
global reach of hate propaganda transmitted from the United
States, where it is legal, and streamed into countries, like France,
where such communications are criminal offenses."48
Much of this variety stems from the difficulty in achieving a
balance without ignoring the important human rights concerns
on both sides. In the United States, freedom of speech, the first
right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, is widely cast in near-abso-
lute terms." It is an approach that has been characterized as
833, 916 (1992). For another particularly interesting example of the dignity
divide see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176-77, 186 (2007) (featuring a
heated debate between the majority and the dissent on whether the real affront
to human dignity was to deny a mentally challenged defendant the right to be
"master of one's fate" and represent himself in court, or to allow him to embar-
rass himself and the legal system by giving him the opportunity).
45. See Wright, supra note 33, at 564-66.
46. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (forbid-
ding state laws to regulate hate speech unless there was the threat of imminent
lawless action).
47. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF HUNGARY, supra note 42; La Ligue
Contre le Racisme et I'Antis6mitisme v. Yahoo!, Inc., Cour Superieure de Paris
[Superior Court of Paris], May 22, 2000, as translated and reprinted in BELLIA ET
AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 94-95 (3d ed. 2007).
48. Tsesis, supra note 25, at 497. This is not a merely hypothetical situa-
tion, as La Ligue Contre le Racisme (Fr.), makes evident.
49. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTs TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLIT-
icAL DiscouRSE 41-43 (1991). See also Knechtle, supra note 20, at 546-49 (argu-
ing that the United States overprotects free speech when compared to other
countries, even considering constitutional differences).
HATE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE
"pure speech jurisprudence."o In contrast, the German
approach is drastically different.' Under the German Constitu-
tion, dignity is the foremost value, and it has been interpreted by
the German Constitutional Court as sometimes superseding free-
dom of speech and expression.52 Most western nations have
adopted an approach similar to Germany's, balancing freedom
of expression with other considerations, rather than taking the
more robustly absolutist approach to speech from the American
model."
Even if all countries agreed on the same basic approach to
preventing hate speech and protecting freedom of expression, a
global solution to hate speech that would be workable in the
online context would still be difficult to achieve, because social
and historical context plays such an important role in determin-
ing which words are hateful. As one scholar has described,
"human dignity is . . . an expression of a sense of being that is
simultaneously personified and imbedded in the relationship
between individuals and their community."5 ' The most destruc-
tive messages are those that rely on historically established
hatreds and symbolism in order to awaken dormant cultural
prejudices. This is the reason why some scholars have urged
the need for a different approach to legislation in the area of
hate speech, in order to more appropriately account for histori-
cal and sociological factors.5 ' Even within the United States, the
Supreme Court has suggested that the state legislatures are in a
better position to define hate speech, because they are more
familiar with local history and practice than federal legislators.5 7
The importance of local variation in animating hate speech
50. TsEsis, supra note 19, at 192.
51. See Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 34.
52. Id. at 1598.
53. Guy E. Carmi, Dignity-The Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Com-
parative Analysis of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 957, 988 (2007); see also Knechtle, supra note 20, at 542-43 (describing the
stance in international agreements and the United Nations, which adopt a
more flexible approach to free speech than the United States in relation to
human dignity).
54. Heinz Kiug, The Dignity Clause of the Montana Constitution: May Foreign
jurisprudence Lead the Way to an Expanded Interpretation?, 64 MoNr. L. REv. 133,
142 (2003).
55. Tsesis, supra note 25, at 503-04.
56. See Knechtle, supra note 20, at 552; Molly Beutz Land, Protecting Rights
Online, 34 YAiF J. INT'L L. 1, 31 (2009).
57. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1951). Though never
expressly overruled, the Supreme Court has declined to defend this position.
See Collin v. Smith 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916,
919 (1978).
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becomes especially problematic in the Internet context-some-
one in the United States may post something potentially deroga-
tory about Jews or Gypsies that would be only mildly offensive in
their home state, but dangerous in the context of the social and
historical circumstances of an Italian reader. It can be hard to
regulate hate speech when the person speaking is not aware that
their words may have a very real and negative impact elsewhere
in the world.
Complicating things even further are cultural differences in
how hurtful messages are typically interpreted, which means the
impact of hate speech, as well as its definition, can vary from
place to place. The importance of words varies by culture." As
Amnon Reichman has observed, being thick skinned is only con-
sidered a positive attribute in some cultures.o In places where
traditional notions of honor are culturally important, the psycho-
logical harm of hate speech and its likelihood to cause violence
are both potentially magnified.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
The disagreements among nations as to what constitutes
hate speech and how much hate speech is acceptable exacerbate
the issues of jurisdiction that accompany most legal problems in
the Internet context."' As David Johnson and David Post have
commented, "A Web site physically located in Brazil ... has no
more of an effect on individuals in Brazil than does a Web site
physically located in Belgium or Belize that is accessible in Bra-
zil. . . . [Online conversations] exist, in effect, everywhere,
nowhere in particular, and only on the Net."6 ' Internet users
have concrete physical locations as they surf the web, but these
are tracked through IP addresses, a system which particularly
motivated or tech-savvy individuals can manipulate, making it
appear as though they are accessing the Internet from another
58. See STANLEY FISH, THERE's No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT'S A
GoOD THING Too 106 (1994) ("And if you ask what words are likely to be pro-
vocative to those nonaverage groups, what are likely to be their fighting words,
the answer is anything and everything ... , every idea is an incitement to some-
body .... ).
59. Amnon Reichman, The Passionate Expression of Hate: Constitutional Pro-
tections, Emotional Harm and Comparative Law, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 76, 125
(2007).
60. Id. at 126.
61. See David R.Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1370-76 (1996). Though the Internet was still
emerging at the time, Johnson and Post foresaw this legal tangle that cyber-
space has caused.
62. Id. at 1375.
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machine or even another country." Because the Internet is not
contained by national boundaries, those national boundaries
(and the laws contained within them) are not easily applied in
the online context.
AsJohnson and Post suggested, though located "nowhere,""
websites impact people everywhere. While one could make an
argument that online content is physically located on the servers
where the information is stored, as Johnson and Post observe,
"only location within a virtual space consisting of the 'addresses'
of the machines between which messages and information are
routed. The system is indifferent to the physical location of those
machines, and there is no necessary connection between an
Internet address and a physical jurisdiction" which makes
assigning sovereignty according to the location of these machines
unsatisfying." There is also an argument that jurisdiction can be
extended based on the physical location of the registry, the com-
pany responsible for matching content with URL addresses and
handing out domain names." This is also an unsatisfactory solu-
tion because it gives countries where the more popular registries
are located a disproportionate amount of control over the
Internet and leaves other countries unable to address harm the
Internet might cause within their borders." Another alternative
63. See id. at 1374 ("[Tjhe determined seeker of prohibited communica-
tions can simply reconfigure his connection so as to appear to reside in a loca-
tion outside the particular locality[.]"); Change Your IP Address, Nuii, http://
www.nuip.net (last visited Feb. 8, 2011) (purporting to give users the ability to
use different servers to mask their Internet activities); Free Proxy Software, PROX-
YWAY, http://www.proxyway.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2011) (same). See also
Andrew Virender, Change IP to Fight Internet Censorship Worldwide, ARTICLEBASE
(Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.articlesbase.com/security-articles/change-ip-to-
fight-internet-censorship-world-wide-1847914.html (explaining that IP chang-
ing software can mask a person's geographic location and enable users in coun-
tries like China and Iran to gain access to information that their government
censors).
64. Johnson & Post, supra note 61, at 1375.
65. Id. at 1371.
66. See GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610,
626-27 (E.D. Va. 2003), where the judge ordered the registry globally responsi-
ble for all .com web addresses to cancel a domain name belonging to a Korean
cybersquatter, even though the individual had already received an injunction by
a Korean court protecting his property interest in the domain name.
67. As the court in GlobalSantaFe stated:
[A]ggressive assertion of United States jurisdiction and control over
the domain name system based on its essentially arbitrary physical
geography [the fact that the most popular domain names are .com
names and the .com registry is located in Virginia] may have the unin-
tended consequence of causing a segmentation of the domain name
system . . . . [leaving] an increasing number of domain names regis-
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would be to allow countries to regulate online activity when that
activity has an effect within their borders or to their citizens, but
this leaves individuals at the mercy of hundreds of nations' laws
whenever they visit a chat room, read a message board, or open a
profile on a social networking site."
Along with these logistical difficulties in deciding which
country has jurisdiction, there are also serious questions about
the legitimacy of national regulation of the Internet." When
individuals vacation in another country, or sign a contract with a
foreign corporation, they are reasonably on notice that their
behavior is subject to regulation by foreign law; such notice is
generally lacking in cyberspace.70 Cases in United States' courts
have recognized that state regulation of the Internet can impli-
cate serious dormant commerce clause issues through the
unwieldiness of a legal regime that subjects Internet users to
diverse overlapping and perhaps even conflicting laws.7 ' These
same issues can play out on the international stage as well,
tered out of the reach of the United States jurisdiction, but accessible
to United States users through the universal domain name system,
which in turn will pose a serious challenge to the enforcement of
United States trademark rights on the Internet.
Id. at 623-24.
68. Even switching from an "effects" test to a more stringent "targeting"
test does not solve the problem, as "it makes little sense to distinguish between
one jurisdiction and another in order to decide which the defendant has
'targeted', when in truth he has 'targeted' every jurisdiction where his text may
be downloaded" and the test, in relying on the subjective intent of the user,
would be "liable to manipulation and uncertainty, and much more likely to
diminish than enhance the interests of justice." Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA
(Civ) 1329 [34] (Eng.).
69. SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 61, at 1370 (commenting that "physical
proximity between the responsible authority and those most directly affected by
the law will improve the quality of the decision making"). But seeJack L. Gold-
smith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Cln. L. REv. 1199 (1998) (arguing that
national regulation of the Internet is no more impossible or illegitimate than
the regulation of any other international activity).
70. Johnson & Post, supra note 61, at 1370 (observing online users can
easily be subject to restrictions unfairly, without "[p]hysical boundaries" to
delineate the world and to provide "notice that the rules change when the
boundaries are crossed").
71. See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) ("The unique nature of the Internet highlights the likelihood that a sin-
gle actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright
inconsistent regulation by states that the actor never intended to reach and
possibly was unaware were being accessed."). The state law at issue not only
burdened interstate commerce, but also threatened "inconsistent legislation
that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet
altogether." Id. at 169. But see State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001)
(upholding a state law prohibiting spam sent to any Washington citizen).
HATE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE
between the laws of different nation states, as was illustrated by
the criminal prosecution of Google employees in Italy."
In February 2010, an Italian court convicted three Google
executives for violating Italian criminal law after some teenagers
uploaded a video onto the Google owned website Google Video,
a video sharing service Google ran prior to acquiring YouTube
later that year." The video showed a disabled classmate being
bullied, and quickly attracted attention as it climbed to the top of
Google Italy's "most entertaining" video list.74 By making this
video accessible to viewers, the Italian court held, Google was vio-
lating national privacy laws, even though the company took the
video down within hours of it being called to its attention.7 5 The
employees, legally responsible for the actions of the company
they worked for, were given six-month suspended sentences.7 6 In
effect, the decision imposes liability on Google for failing to
review content before allowing it to be uploaded to the website.
Within the national boundaries of Italy the decision may be
ideologically troubling, but its impact is not particularly problem-
atic. The Internet, however, is not so neatly confined by borders
of sovereignty. While reviewing the small percentage of videos
posted by Italians might be feasible, 7  reviewing all the videos
accessible to Italian viewers is not.7 ' The problem would be mul-
72. See Tribunale Ordinario di Milano, 12 aprile 2010, available in Italian
at http://speciali.espresso.repubblica.it/pdf/Motivazioni-sentenzaGoogle.
pdf.
73. Manuela D'Alessandro, Google Executives Convicted for Italy Autism Video,
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61N2G5
20100224.
74. Colleen Barry, Italy Convicts 3 Google Execs in Abuse Video Case, Associ
ATED PRESS, Mar. 30, 2010, available at http://www.sfexaminer.com/world/
google-trial-verdict-will-help-define-internet-freedom-in-italy-85166697.html.
75. Matt Sucherman, Serious Threat to the Web in Italy, GOOGLE Bi.oc. (Feb.
24, 2010, 1:57 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/serious-threat-
to-web-in-italy.html (discussing the serious threat to the Internet in Italy). But
seeJeff Israely, Italy's Google Verdict Starts Debate on Web Freedom, TIME.COM (Feb.
25, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,859 9 ,1968123,00.
html?xid=rss-topstories (recounting that, according to the prosecutors, Google
knew about the video for months before taking it down).
76. Barry, supra note 74.
77. Id.; Sucherman, supra note 75.
78. According to the Alexa traffic reports for YouTube as of February 8,
2011, only 3.5% of YouTube's traffic comes from Italian IP addresses, and pre-
sumably the content generated by these users is roughly proportionate. Alexa
Traffic Report for You Tube, ALExA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/youtube.com#
(click on "audience") (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
79. The YouTube website says that over twenty-four hours' worth of con-
tent is uploaded to the site every minute. YouTube Fact Sheet, YouTUBE, http://
www.youtube.com/t/fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). See also Hunter Walk,
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tiplied manifold if other countries began enforcing their own
regulations-requiring that Google review every video to ensure
compliance with Italian, Russian, American, Japanese, Saudi,
Ugandan, Bolivian, and South African law, for instance, would be
an unrealistic demand. The result of such liability would drasti-
cally affect the feasibility of internet services and applications. In
this way, a few countries could inhibit innovation and limit the
availability of Internet services and technology to the entire
world.so
Beyond the proposition that nations simply should not regu-
late the Internet is the fact that they cannot realistically enforce
Oops, Pow, Sus.prise .. 24 Hours of Video all Up in YourEyes!, YouTuI BLOG (Mar.
17, 2010), http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2010/03/oops-pow-surprise24-
hours-of-video-all.html (announcing that a new record had been set as users
uploaded 24 hours of video, enough to fill an entire day, in the space of a single
minute). As mentioned earlier, because of Internet users' ability to change or
mask their IP addresses, some Italian viewers would still be able to see content
that had not been approved for Italians, even if Google attempted to put block-
ing mechanisms in place. Furthermore, the Italian case hinged on the privacy
of an Italian citizen being violated, not on Italian users being able to view con-
tent. This matters, because it suggests that content violating the privacy of an
Italian citizen would be illegal, even if it were only visible to people in other
countries, essentially allowing Italy to censor content globally. Things can
become even more complicated; consider, for instance, a hypothetical video
posted by a Canadian user and filmed in New York City, but which portrays an
Italian citizen visiting the United States on vacation. Even if every video, visible
anywhere in the world, were reviewed by a team of Google employees, the ano-
nymity of the Internet might make it impossible to comply with such privacy
laws.
80. For suggestions that the Italian Google decision could have a sinister
impact on the Internet, particularly if mirrored by other countries, see Chris
Califf, Google Case in Italy May Alter Web Experience, ATHENs BANNER-HERALD (Mar.
7, 2010), http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/030710/bus 571688040.shtml
(saying "these limitations [subjecting Internet services like Google and
Facebook to liability for failing to monitor user content] could drastically alter
the way we experience the Internet"); Ann Woolner, Italy Risks Internet Stone Age
with Trial of Google Executives, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 1, 2010), http://
www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/italy-risks-internet-stone-age-
with-trial-of-google-executives-20100228-pb4u.html (quoting Professor Eric
Goldman of Santa Clara University as saying cases like the Italian Google deci-
sion "absolutely suppress entrepreneurial innovation" and that a similar atti-
tude towards the Internet in the United States would have "killed eBay,
YouTube, Facebook and the rest before they got started"). See also Sucherman,
supra note 75 ("[The conviction] attacks the very principles of freedom on
which the Internet is built. .. . [If] sites like Blogger, YouTube and indeed every
social network and any community bulletin board, are held responsible for vet-
ting every single piece of content that is uploaded to them . . . then the Web as
we know it will cease to exist, and many of the economic, social, political and
technological benefits it brings could disappear.").
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the regulations they do make.' This was illustrated in a series of
cases concerning Yahoo! and the sale of Nazi memorabilia. The
Yahoo! website featured auctions, where individual users could
offer items for other users to bid on. Some people listed Nazi
memorabilia, and French groups sued Yahoo! for violating
French Criminal law, which prohibited "the exhibition of Nazi
items for sale."82 Although the French Yahoo! website, at www.
yahoo.fr, did not contain such material, it linked to the American
website, at www.geocities.com, where the memorabilia could be
purchased." The French government asserted jurisdiction
because the "damage was suffered in France,"84 and ordered
Yahoo! to "prevent any access . . . to the auction service . . . ."
Yahoo! partially complied with the order, posting warnings and
amending the auction policy, but it did not block French citizens
from accessing the auction site and viewing the prohibited
items." In response, the French government threatened to
impose a penalty of 100,000 Francs." A United States federal
court refused to enforce the order, despite principles of comity
and a desire to avoid "disrespect,"" because it held that enforc-
ing the French decision would violate the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution. 9
As the Yahoo! cases indicate, enforcing sovereignty online is
not as simple as a nation deciding that it has jurisdiction. In
order for this jurisdiction to have any meaning, that nation also
needs to convince others of the propriety of the jurisdiction,"
81. SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 61, 1370-75.
82. BELLIA ET AL., supra note 47, at 94-95.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. This decision could have been logistically difficult for Yahoo! to
enforce, because companies only have a limited ability to determine the physi-
cal location of Internet users, particularly without incurring great expense. See
supra note 63 and the accompanying text. See also BELLIA ET AL., supra note 47,
at 95 (indicating that Yahoo! made the argument that such filtering was techno-
logically unfeasible).
86. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antis6mitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181, 1185-86 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev'd en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
2006).
87. Id. at 1185.
88. Id. at 1187, 1192.
89. Id. at 1193.
90. Exceptions occur when the entity the government is attempting to
regulate has a physical presence within the country, such as servers or employ-
ees (which can be moved by a corporation who grows weary of the regulation)
or when the entity operates a website governed by a registry within the state's
borders. On this last point, see GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F.
Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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which can be difficult given the resources at stake" and the basic
disagreement among nations over the proper balance between
free speech and human dignity.92 While mere pronouncements
about whether behavior is acceptable might have limited utility,93
most countries would presumably prefer that these pronounce-
ments be followed. Yet given the borderless nature of the
Internet, it can be extremely difficult for nations to effectively
prosecute online behavior, even that which has had severe reper-
cussions within its sovereign boundaries.
International coordination and regulation is also a problem-
atic solution. Traditional customs and procedures that govern
transnational activities are difficult to translate to the Internet
context because of the massive amounts of information that trav-
els online." Specific treaties on the issue are also largely
unworkable. Without universal ratification, most Internet com-
panies would move their servers to the countries who were not
participating in the agreement, and hate speakers from any
country could continue to spread their hateful comments
throughout the world." Furthermore, it would be extremely dif-
91. In addition to playing an important role in human rights and becom-
ing increasingly relevant to criminal investigations, the Internet is also worth a
lot of money. Internet advertising alone is forecasted to reach $147 billion by
2012, according to Kelsey Group. See Press Release, Kelsey Group, Interactive
Advertising Revenues to Reach US$147 Billion Globally by 2012 (Feb. 25,
2008), available at http://www.kelseygroup.com/press/pr080225.asp. This
does not include the substantial online sales markets for physical goods (like
clothes and plane tickets), information (like Westlaw and LexisNexis), and
software (like iPhone applications).
92. See supra notes 19-60 and accompanying text.
93. See Citron v. Zfindel, (2002) 41 C.H.R.R. D/148, para. 298-300 (Can.
Human Rights Trib.), available at http://chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/search/files/t460
1596de.pdf (recognizing the didactic functions of the law and proclaiming that,
while "extremely conscious of the limits of the remedial power available in this
case ... [and the technological issues hindering] eliminating the material from
telephonic communication," the tribunal was nevertheless condemning the
behavior of a United States citizen because of "the responsibility of determining
the complaints referred" to the court and upholding the "significant symbolic
value in the public denunciation" of racist speech).
94. See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 61, at 1372-73 ("United States
Customs officials have generally given up.. . . [A]nd claim no right to force
declarations of the value of materials transmitted by modem... . [Nations are
fjaced with their inability to control the flow of electrons across physical
borders.").
95. David G. Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy," 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1365, 1378 (2002) ("Scale matters... . Rules and principles that may be quite
reasonable at one scale may become incoherent and unreasonable at
another.").
96. After all, as Johnson & Post suggest, the location of servers is irrele-
vant because "[m]essages can be transmitted from one physical location to any
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ficult to draft a treaty to deal with Internet hate speech that was
specific enough to be meaningful but that did not conflict with
the constitutions of at least some countries." Firstly, the United
States has taken an anomalous stance on the regulation of hate
speech when compared to much of the rest of the world, who do
not offer it a constitutionally protected status akin to political dis-
sent." Secondly, the United States has a disproportionate con-
trol over the Internet because most of the popular registries,
including the one that controls all the ".com" websites in the
world, are located within its borders.99 This control, combined
with the United States' inability to join a treaty that conflicted
with the First Amendment, would likely frustrate any carefully
drawn international agreements that take a more moderate
stance towards balancing free speech and other human rights. 00
REGULATION BY THIRD PARTIES
Corporations are generally not bound by national constitu-
tions; outside of rare exceptions, a company, even an American
company that does business only in the United States, can restrict
speech arbitrarily without running afoul of the First Amend-
ment.'o' As many scholars have observed, this means that corpo-
other location without degradation, decay, or substantial delay, and without any
physical cues or barriers that might otherwise keep certain geographically
remote places and people separate from one another." Supra note 61, at
1370-71.
97. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Carmi, supra note 53, at 988.
99. See GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 250 F. Supp. 2d 610
(E.D. Va. 2003) (explaining the registry system, commenting on the vast juris-
diction the court has over .com and .net addresses because of the locations of
the registries, and holding that an appropriate remedy could include ordering
the registry to cancel a website owned by a foreign individual, even against the
injunction of a foreign court).
100. See Knechtle, supra note 20, at 542.
101. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Supreme Court
applied the First Amendment against a corporation who had restricted prosely-
tizing on the sidewalk of a company-owned town. Later decisions such as Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), made it clear that Marsh's applicability was
limited. In Lloyd, which allowed a large shopping mall to prohibit the quiet
distribution of anti-war materials, the Court largely confined Marsh to its facts,
explaining that it "involved an economic anomaly of the past, 'the company
town'" and that Marsh only meant that "where private interests were substitut-
ing for and performing the customary functions of government, First Amend-
ment freedoms could not be denied where exercised in the customary manner
on the town's sidewalks and streets." Id. at 561-63. While there are those who
argue that companies like Google, given their place of public trust and impor-
tance to modern life, should be held similarly accountable, Supreme Court pre-
cedent clearly does not support such a position. See Nicholas P. Dickerson,
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rations can "potentially engage in massive regulation of Internet
content that would be patently unconstitutional if carried out by
Congress . . . ." Certainly, the corporations that control the
Internet are better positioned to regulate it than governments,
not only because they are free from legal constitutional restric-
tions, but also because they can easily reach across most national
borders and more directly enforce their decisions. 1o
Many have championed a free market approach to the
Internet'0 4 and there is evidence that the United States Congress
prefers this model. 05 Under a free market system, the theory
goes, individuals are free to choose which websites they would
Comment, What Makes the Internet So Special? And Why, Where, How, and By Whom
Should Its Content Be Regulated?, 46 Hous. L. Ri.v. 61, 91-92 (2009). In fact,
there is even limited precedent which suggests not only that corporate entities
are free to ignore the First Amendment, but also that the government cannot
regulate them by preventing censorship in search engine results, because this
infringes on the companies' freedom of speech in determining which results are
returned for a given search. See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No.
CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. 2003).
102. Dickerson, supra note 101, at 79.
103. Indeed, for this reason, much national regulation of the Internet has
been attempted through prohibiting conduct of corporations, rather than indi-
viduals. Consider, for example, the cases discussed in the previous section of
this Note-the Italian government imposing criminal liability on Google for
hosting offensive material and French citizens suing Yahoo! for allowing access
to auctions for prohibited items. See supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
This is especially marked because both national law enforcement and potential
plaintiffs cannot easily ascertain the identity of an Internet user without assis-
tance from the Internet service provider. The United States Congress is well
aware of this fact, as reflected in the online music piracy context. See Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006) (providing for subpoe-
nas, which copyright holders can request in order to force an Internet service
provider to provide identification of the alleged infringer).
104. See, e.g., Kyle McSlarrow, President & CEO of Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n, Net Neutrality: First Amendment Rhetoric in Search of the
Constitution, Remarks Before the Media Institute in Washington, D.C., at para.
14 (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.ncta.com/PublicationType/Speech/
Net-Neutrality-First-Amendment-Rhetoric-in-Search-of-the-Constitution .aspx
(arguing that network neutrality laws are inappropriate because Internet service
providers "have stated repeatedly that they will not block their customers from
accessing any lawful content or application on the Internet. Competitive pres-
sures alone ensure this result: we are in the business of maximizing our custom-
ers' choices and experiences on the Internet.").
105. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2006)
(stating that "[i]t is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . ."); see also
Dickerson, supra note 101, at 63 (maintaining that "perhaps recognizing the
blatant unconstitutionality of government-imposed, content-based regulations,
Congress . . . . granted Internet Service Providers (ISPs) carte blanche to regu-
late as they see fit.").
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like to visit according to their interests and preferences.' In
the speech context, this means that people who prefer not to
encounter hate speech can simply choose to frequent websites
with active moderating, while those who would rather encounter
the unfiltered views of others can choose Internet sites which
have rejected all filtering in order to capture these users'
interest.
The problem with the free market approach is that it com-
pares an imperfect legal system with a perfect market system, and
the market system is not perfect.o 7 It incentivizes content prov-
iders to focus on more profitable groups, such as those who are
the most likely to respond to advertising,os and can lead content
providers to manipulate consumers in order to gain their atten-
tion.'"9 In addition, people may not always want the Internet
that their consumer choices might shape;' 0 "[t]o be a con-
106. SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 13-17.
107. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management, "97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 491 (1998) (stating "all real-world
institutions, including market-based ones, are imperfect, and .. . it is real-world
institutions that must be compared."); see also id. at 481 (pointing out, in the
context of the Internet and intellectual property rights, that "' [c]ontract,' 'mar-
ket,' and 'property'-the efficient building blocks of the new social order-
have talismanic significance, with the result that private-law forms of regulation
are advocated absent any proof that they would produce the best regime, or
even a good one, for disseminating information and promoting ongoing crea-
tive progress.").
108. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 781, 787-88 (1987)
(replying "[t]here is a great deal of force to those arguments [that a free mar-
ket of choices should prevail], but they obscure a deeper truth-a market, even
one that is working perfectly, is itself a structure of constraint . . . . [It] privi-
leges select groups, by making [the media] especially responsive to their needs
and desires . . . those who have the capital to acquire or own [media services]
... those who control the advertising budgets of various businesses ... [and]
those who are the most able and most likely to respond enthusiastically to
advertising.").
109. SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 18-19.
110. Id. at 113-14. Sunstein has observed that "citizens in a democratic
system, aware [of their long-term interests and the need for a civically informed
populace], might want to make choices that diverge from those that they make
in their capacity as private consumers." Id. at 113. Sunstein offers specific
examples of this, noting that "some people support efforts to promote serious
coverage of public issues on television, even though their own consumption
patterns favor situation comedies; they seek stringent laws protecting the envi-
ronment or endangered species, even though they do not use the public parks
or derive material benefits from protection of such species; they approve of laws
calling for social security and welfare even though they do not save or give to
the poor; they support antidiscrimination laws even though their own behavior
is hardly race- or gender- neutral." Id. at 114.
20111] 7
298 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHIGS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25
sumer, even a sovereign one, is not to be a citizen."' '' Further-
more, the greater the power disparity between content providers
and content users, the more likely it is that the market system will
be imperfect, and in the Internet context, where millions of users
are bound by contracts of adhesion for which they had no oppor-
tunity to bargain, free choice in the marketplace may be more
fiction than reality." 2
Even if the markets functioned perfectly within the Internet
context and everyone was able to interact in the online environ-
ment of their choosing, it might still be unwise to rely on free
markets because of the polarizing effect they can have in the
speech context. As Cass Sunstein observes in his book Republic.
com, strong market pressures can have "potentially destructive
effects" on government and society." 3 When users can choose to
see only what they want to see, and gravitate to websites which
share their point of view, people cease to encounter opposing
viewpoints or share common experiences, which are precondi-
tions for any large democracy."4
Perhaps even more troubling, as various psychological stud-
ies have shown, "[a]fter deliberation, people are likely to move
toward a more extreme point in the direction to which the
group's members were originally inclined.""' This means that if
popular websites like YouTube overcensor in order to stay non-
offensive to the masses, people who wish to engage in mean-spir-
ited speech are more likely to seek out websites sharing hateful
viewpoints and, by participating in conversation solely with other
racists, become more racist themselves. People who are unilater-
ally prevented from speaking without a chance to defend them-
selves are more likely to visit other forums where they hear
nothing but continually crescendo-ing echoes of their own view-
points, causing more extremism and contempt.' 16
111. Fiss, supra note 108, at 788.
112. See MargaretJane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine
144, reprinted in LAW AND SOCIETY: APPROACHES TO CYBERSPACE 265, 267 (Paul
Schiff Berman ed. 2007) (exploring the pervasiveness of online contracts,
"binding on anyone accessing the site, regardless of whether anyone ever opens
the link that reveals them").
113. SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 14.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 65 (emphasis omitted).
116. Id. at 9. See also Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and
Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82
CAIF. L. REv. 871, 878 (1994) ("Hate speech may make the speaker feel better,
at least temporarily, but it does not make the victim safer. Quite the contrary,
the psychological evidence suggests that permitting one person to say or do
hateful things to another increases, rather than decreases, the chance that he or
HA TE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE 2
TRANSPARENCY AND DISCUSSION
Both Fiss and Sunstein make compelling arguments, but
there is another critical issue with reliance on free markets to
deal with concerning Internet hate speech: the frequent lack of
transparency. The imperfections of free markets are magnified
when the process lacks transparency."' It is difficult for users to
"shop" for censorship policies they find unpalatable when the
process of Internet content regulation by third parties is so often
invisible. While it would be fairly easy to determine when a
forum's approach to censorship was overly lax by the user's stan-
dards, because the user would encounter material which
offended him or her, the reverse is not so true. A user who
found a website devoid of any controversial remarks might not
know whether this was because only mild-mannered content had
been posted, or if it was due to a pervasive censorship policy that
resulted in content being removed that the user would not find
objectionable-even potentially under circumstances when the
removal would offend the user, if he or she was aware that it had
occurred.
Today, many websites take a markedly opaque approach in
regulating content. For instance, consider YouTube, one of the
most popular forums for online expression today."" After users
she will do so again in the future. Moreover, others may believe it is permissible
to follow suit."). For a further discussion of the modern move towards reinforc-
ing views, see R. George Wright, Self-Censorship and the Constriction of Thought and
Discussion Under Modern Communications Technologies, 25 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICs
& Pun. Po.'y 123 (2011).
117. This long-recognized connection has been stressed by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, which observed that "[t]here is a strong consensus for
making transparency the 'golden rule' of the new international financial sys-
tem," and "[a] lack of transparency has been found at the origin of each recur-
ring crises in the emerging markets." Michael Camdessus, Managing Dir. of the
Int'l Monetary Fund, Stable and Efficient Financial Systems for the 21st Cen-
tury: A Quest for Transparency and Standards, Address at the XXIVth Annual
Conference of the Int'l Org. of Securities Comm'n (May 25, 1999), available at
http://imf.org/external/np/speeches/1999/052599.htm.
118. According to Alexa.com's reports, as of February 10, 2011, YouTube
was the third most popular website in the world, behind only Google and
Facebook, and ahead of Yahoo!. Alexa Top 500 Global Sites, ALEXA, http://www.
alexa.com/topsites (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). A look at the ranking history
shows that YouTube fluctuates between the 3rd spot and the 4th spot in the
rankings, alternating every few days. YouTube Site Info, ALExA, http://www.
alexa.com/siteinfo/youtube.com (click on "Traffic Rank") (last visited Feb. 10,
2011). The popularity of the website not only affects the quantity of material
available, but also means that speakers can attract a potentially enormous audi-
ence. See, e.g., Alastair Jamieson, Couple's Wedding Entrance Dance Becomes You-
Tube Viral Hit, TELEGRAPH (London) (July 26, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/5913746/Couples-wedding-entrance-
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upload clips to YouTube, watchers who find the content distaste-
ful have the option to flag the video for removal, alleging that
the material violates YouTube's community guidelines.' " A
moderator, who is employed by YouTube, later reviews the mate-
rial and makes a decision whether to comply with the request to
take the content down or to leave it up. 12
This "flag and unilateral-review system" is much like that
used in the online context for perceived violations of intellectual
property, under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.' 2 ' Under
that regime, websites which allow users to upload content, like
YouTube and Facebook, are insulated from liability for contain-
ing material which violates copyright law, but only if they follow
the statute's notice-and-takedown procedure.122 A copyright
holder, identifying the material as improperly posted, is
instructed to send notification to the content provider.'12  The
company then needs to notify the original poster of the infringe-
dance-becomes-YouTube-viral-hit.html (describing how a video of one couple's
wedding procession, uploaded to YouTube, went viral and attracted over six
and a half million views within its first week online). YouTube has become
increasingly important in traditional media forums as well. For instance, after
showing an interview of music artist Rihanna speaking out about domestic vio-
lence, 20/20 aired a follow-up story the following week about women's reac-
tions to the interview, based on user-uploaded commentary on YouTube. ABC
even played clips from some of the YouTube videos on the program. 20/20
(ABC television broadcast Nov. 13, 2009).
119. Some of these standards are quite broad and subject to interpreta-
tion, asking users not to "post videos showing bad stuff." The specific provision
for hate speech more concretely provides "[w]e encourage free speech and
defend everyone's right to express unpopular points of view. But we don't per-
mit hate speech (speech which attacks or demeans a group based on race or
ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, veteran status, and sexual orien-
tation/gender identity)." However, as the terms themselves acknowledge, there
can be "a fine line between what is and what is not considered hate speech"
under this definition. YouTube Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, http://www.you
tube.comn/t/communityguidelines (click on "Hate Speech" under "Commu-
nity Guideline Tips") (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) [hereinafter YouTunI.
120. It is worth noting that this procedure is not a unique facet of You-
Tube. Facebook, for instance, employs the same flagging/moderation scheme,
based on similarly vague user terms of agreement. Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities as revised October 4, 2010, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
terms.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) [hereinafter FAciEBOOK] (prohibiting "con-
tent that: is hateful, threatening, or pornographic" but also forbidding people
to use Facebook to do anything "discriminatory" or take action that "infringes
or violates someone else's rights").
121. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a), (c), (g)
(2006).
122. Id.
123. Id. § 512(c).
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ment and remove the offending material.' 24 This copyright
scheme has been subject to considerable criticism because it fre-
quently leads websites, concerned about their own liability, to
pull material even when the request for removal is unfounded.125
The United States Congress, however, has enacted this process
only for copyright infringements, and there is no legal require-
ment to use the flag-unilateral review system in the hate speech
context, where no such legislation governs.
In the hate speech context, the flag and unilateral-review sys-
tem can create an over-policing of hate speech that unfairly
infringes on users' freedom of expression. This is especially true
given the flexibility and room for interpretation inherent in
many websites' terms of use.'12  Viewers can flag material, and
moderators can subsequently have it taken down, merely because
they disagree with the viewpoint of the speaker, no matter how
appropriate others might find the content. This is not mere
speculation; YouTube has been accused of viewpoint restriction
in the past.'2 1
Conversely, the flag and unilateral-review system can also
lead to underpolicing of hate speech. While any user can flag a
video as offensive, if the moderator disagrees, then the hateful
speech remains in place. 128 A bias on the part of the moderator
can distort the content left online, and his actions need not even
be intentional. Because hate speech only functions as hate
speech within a specific historical-cultural context,'2 9 a modera-
tor's mere unawareness of the background of some of the viewers
can allow hateful speech to remain in place.
These issues highlight the problematic nature of the flag
and unilateral-review system, and suggest a better alternative-
one with increased transparency and communication. Under
such a scheme, users who encountered content they found objec-
tionable could raise the issue in a flagging comment, explaining
why they thought the content was offensive. This comment
124. Id. § 512(g).
125. BELLIA ET AL., supra note 47, at 526-27.
126. See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 120; YouTumE, supra note 119.
127. See Luann Dawkins, YouTube Banned Videos: Censorship Gone Too Far?,
STor ACLU (Jan. 25, 2009), http://www.stoptheaclu.com/2009/01/25/you
tube-banned-videos-censorship-gone-too-far/ (suggesting that YouTube moder-
ators took down respectful arguments against gay marriage while leaving videos
supporting gay marriage in place. The article features a copy of the video
which was taken down, along with video clips that were left up, to highlight the
potentially arbitrary or politically biased methods that can prevail when the con-
tent regulation decisions are made by a single moderator.).
128. See YouTUBE, supra note 119, for an explanation of the process.
129. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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would be visible to all users, so others could read and comment
on it in turn. The original poster of the material would also have
the opportunity to publically respond. After a certain period of
time had passed, a moderator, considering all of the discussion,
would make a final decision, explaining the reasoning behind
their determination. The content would then be taken down,
though the discussion about the content might be best left up, in
order to facilitate continued thought about censorship and make
it easier for those visiting the website to judge the particular
atmosphere of the site.
In this way, a transparent system of censorship has the
advantage of bolstering the free market approach by allowing
people to understand what content is being kept from them, ena-
bling them to make better informed decisions about the websites
they wish to frequent and support. At the same time, this trans-
parency may ameliorate some of Professor Sunstein's concerns
about the polarization of constant viewpoint reinforcement,so
because by seeing what content was removed from a website,
even users who disagreed with it would encounter the opposing
view.
A transparent approach is also a better method for dealing
with fundamental human rights issues, like those that free speech
and hate speech entail. By increasing the efficacy of the free
markets, letting users view the content being targeted for
removal puts more autonomy back into the hands of the people.
This is particularly true if the system allows not only for trans-
parency, but also for a general discussion of the acceptability of
the content. Some complain that regulation of hate speech is
patronizing,1 3 ' but it is much less so if it is discussed and imposed
by the community, rather than by a moderator acting behind the
scenes. People should have a limited ability to make the market
accountable-if Sunstein is correct, allowing this input may even
encourage people to make better decisions than their behavior
suggests they would support. 3 2
Encouraging people to publically discuss whether or not
content should be taken down would also allow local community
influence to play more of a role in defining what is offensive.
Because hate speech is defined entirely by the norms of the com-
munity,' 3 this can be crucial. Transparency keeps the modera-
130. SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 9.
131. See, e.g., Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational Insti-
tutions: A Proposed Policy, 31 SANTA CIARA L. REV. 345, 380 (1991).
132. SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 18-19.
133. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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tor from making content decisions based on personal preference
and bias; allowing an open discussion of the targeted material
before a decision is made would more fully inform the modera-
tor of the Web browsers' perceptions of the content.
This is a particularly powerful idea given how the Internet is
redefining the importance of geography and community. Part of
the reason why national regulation of the Internet has become so
problematic is because online communities do not match the
boundaries of "real life" communities. As Professor Berman
observed, "[B]y analyzing the social meaning of our affiliations
across space, we can think about . . .. community not as a geo-
graphically determined territory circumscribed by fixed bounda-
ries, but as 'articulated moments in networks of social relations
and understandings.'"" Online communities are becoming
increasingly more important, 3 5 and online transnational-cul-
tures are emerging.'"' As time goes on and these communities
start to share more history, while displacing, or at least comple-
menting, traditional geographic communities, their cultural con-
tent may have an important role in shaping and defining hate
speech. Giving online communities the ability to express
whether or not content offends them, rather than leaving the
decision in the hands of a single individual, who may not necessa-
rily share the same background of experience, lends more legiti-
macy to Internet regulation.
The main drawback to this transparent, user-driven
approach is that potentially hateful speech would have to be left
up for a period of time to allow discussion. The main arguments
that scholars such as Tsesis have raised against hate speech, how-
ever, stem from it becoming commonplace and accepted. 3 1
Speech that is branded as potential hate speech and is being
scrutinized as such is less likely to impact the viewpoints of peo-
ple reading it or to cause psychological harm to potential victims
134. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization ofjurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
311, 321-22 (2002) (quoting DOREEN MASSEY, SPACE, PLACE, AND GENDER 154
(1994)).
135. There are concerns that social networking sites and Internet mes-
sage boards are displacing traditional social interaction. See, e.g., Mishra Planes-
walker, Is Facebook Replacing Face Time?, HEIUM, http://www.helium.com/
items/I 312288-facebook-is-replacing-real-social-skills (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
136. See, e.g., Theresa McGinnis et al., "Indnpride": Online Spaces of Trans-
national Youth as Sites of Creative and Sophisticated Literacy and Identity Work, 18
LINGUISTICS & EDuc. 283, 283 (2007) (stating in the abstract that "technological
sites are important and dynamic representational spaces for youth to engage in
. . . identity work").
137. See TsEsIs, supra note 19, at 138.
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who may come in contact with it. Hate speech, when named for
what it is, loses most of its hurtful impact.
CONcLusION
While the Internet has brought people together by enabling
individuals from all over the world to communicate as though
they lived next-door, it has also created rifts of distance as it
enables people to harm each other in ways that were never
before possible. In the context of hate speech, the anonymity of
the Internet and the potentially massive audience that one can
attract has led to a serious and growing problem.
Policing hate speech is a complex issue with important con-
sequences that implicates serious human rights issues on either
side of the debate. Furthermore, because of disagreements over
the importance of free expression and the impracticality and ille-
gitimacy of translating national jurisdiction into cyberspace, gov-
ernment regulation is unlikely to produce a solution to the
problem. This leaves the determination largely in the hands of
corporations and the markets, which means transparency is cru-
cial. Implementing procedures that incorporate transparency
and user discussion, rather than leaving censorship decisions
entirely in the hands of two invisible individuals, encourages
awareness of the problem and allows the specific audience of the
speech to determine what is appropriate.
